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The wars of dissolution in the Former Yugoslavia from 1991 to 
1995 created a refugee crisis on a scale unseen in Europe since the 
end of the second World War.1 A chief aim of the aggressors in these 
wars of dissolution was to physically displace large numbers of 
people utilizing systematic terror campaigns of murder, rape, torture, 
and other forms of intimidation—collectively known as “ethnic 
cleansing.”2 The goals of ethnic cleansing were to create ethnically 
“pure” territories within the republics, specifically those that 
previously confederated to form the Socialist Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (SFRJ), and to force the re-drawing of national 
boundaries to reflect the ethnic make-up of the newly devised 
majorities in these territories. 
Until that crisis in Europe, the Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees3 (1951 Convention) and the Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees4 (1967 Protocol) were the only legal foundations 
for refugee protection in the European context. In the years following 
the second World War, the 1951 Convention, setting high standards 
of eligibility, provided lasting protection for the predominantly 
political refugees that invoked its aid. The host countries provided 
stable shelter for those refugees, and their status as 1951 Convention 
refugees regularly led to permanent integration into a new society.5 
Return to their home country, although the most favorable ending to 
their refugee status, was not a realistic option. As a result, the use of 
the cessation clauses of the 1951 Convention almost never became 
reality.  
For the first time following the second World War, the 
disintegrating Former Yugoslavia presented the European States with 
a large number of refugees at one time. The 1951 Convention 
 
 1. See generally NORMAN L. CIGAR, GENOCIDE IN BOSNIA: THE POLICY OF “ETHNIC 
CLEANSING” (1995). 
 2. See id. 
 3. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1, 189 U.N.T.S. 
137, 152 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. 
 4. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, art. I, ¶ 2, 606 U.N.T.S. 
267, 268 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. 
 5. See infra  Part II.C.  
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mechanisms, although adequate for the mainly “political refugees” of 
the second World War, were no longer adequate to meet the 
emerging post-war protection needs. Finally, in the 1990s, existing 
European refugee law and policies reached a breaking point.6 Not 
only did the European States consider refugee determination 
procedures to be overly burdensome, but there also were significant 
discrepancies in “burden-sharing” between the individual States. 
In addition, the conflicting opinions and interpretations 
concerning the character of the war against Bosnia -Herzegovina and 
Croatia complicated the international community’s early political and 
humanitarian efforts. Ultimately, characterization of the conflicts in 
the Former Yugoslavia as “civil wars” ignited the European States 
strict position that those fleeing civil war situations were not 1951 
Convention refugees, automatically excluding those fleeing the 
Former Yugoslavia from 1951 Convention refugee status. 
Nonetheless, people fleeing the horrors of aggressions against 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia were still in need of protection. The 
international community needed to find a compromise.7 
Meanwhile, the international peace process included peace-
keeping efforts and the provision of material assistance to people 
within active war zones. The peace-keeping process also was aimed 
at preventing large numbers of people from moving across 
 
 6. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, THE STATE OF THE 
WORD ’S REFUGEES (1995). 
At the end of the Second World War, everything was different. The war had wrought 
considerable damage and manpower was needed for rebuilding. Moreover, during the 
heyday of the Cold War, many European nations had strong ideological reasons for 
welcoming refugees. Today, the political and socioeconomic climate has changed. It 
has been years since growth was taken for granted. The emphasis now is on conserving 
what Europe has. Today’s high unemployment—12 million people jobless in Western 
Europe—exacerbates a growing tendency toward xenophobia. The European continent 
sees one racist attack every three minutes—and reception centers for asylum-seekers 
are all too often target. Meanwhile, Europe is producing refugees. With the Yugoslav 
crisis and the dramas unreeling across the Caucasus—in Georgia, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan, Chechnya—the continent of Europe now counts more than 6.5 million 
refugees. 
Id. 
 7. See STANLEY HOFFMANN, THE ETHICS AND POLITICS OF HUMANITARIAN 
INTERVENTION 195-206 (1996). 
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international borders,8 thereby forming the political foundation for 
Europe’s introduction of a new “temporary protection” concept.9 This 
concept’s legal foundation consisted of two premises: the obligation 
of a State not to produce refugee outflows, and the right of people to 
return to their home country. 
The obligation of a State not to produce refugee outflows as an 
internationally recognized duty, as in the case of Bosnia–
Herzegovina and Croatia, automatically landed on the Socialist 
Republic of Yugoslavia. Their political actions and military 
operations caused huge numbers of people to seek security in 
neighboring neutral countries. Based on the obligation of a State to 
provide a minimum standard of treatment for its citizens, and the 
obligation not to produce refugees, a new discussion concerning the 
“right not to become a refugee” emerged in refugee law. However, 
international law has neither established nor recognized this “right to 
remain” in the home country. In contrast, for those forced to flee their 
countries of origin, the “right of return” to their home countries 
became an internationally recognized human right that ought to be 
guaranteed. The exercise of this right of return was envisaged as the 
cornerstone of the concept of temporary protection. 
In short, under a new concept of temporary protection, emphasis 
was placed on the prevention of refugee movements in the first 
instance, followed by the exercise of the right of return to the home 
country after a short period of protection in European countries. The 
entire concept was return-oriented. States were to use money that was 
saved on refugee status determination procedures, guaranteed to 1951 
Convention refugees for peace-building and humanitarian operations, 
not only to assist the remaining population of Bosnia -Herzegovina to 
survive, but also to facilitate the return process of those sheltered in 
European countries. 
This Article addresses problems inherent in the application of 
temporary protection to the large number of genuine 1951 
Convention refugees from Bosnia -Herzegovina. After termination of 
their temporary protection status, such refugees usually had two 
 
 8. See JAMES GOW, T RIUMPH OF THE LACK OF WILL: INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND 
THE YUGOSLAV WAR 12-45 (1997). 
 9. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/4
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options: return to their country of origin, usually to a place 
determined on the basis of their ethnicity as opposed to their place of 
former residence, or apply for permanent resettlement in the United 
States, Canada, or Australia.10 This Article concentrates on 
differences between return to the home country for 1951 Convention 
refugees and return to the home country for those given temporary 
protection. Analysis of the ongoing return process to Bosnia -
Herzegovina, under the existing operational plan and related 
provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords,11 reveals that the right of 
return offered to people under temporary protection does not satisfy 
internationally accepted requirements established for the voluntary 
repatriation of 1951 Convention refugees. First, return is not truly 
voluntary because the decision to return lies with the host State and 
not with the refugee. Second, the return process is not a true 
repatriation, but rather a relocation for ethnic purposes.12 
This position is based two premises: actions that were taken 
violated refugees’ rights to remain in their home country, and 
refugees’ exercise of the right of return does not meet internationally 
recognized standards. This Article argues that refugees from Bosnia -
Herzegovina who spent more than five years under temporary 
protection in Europe are in fact genuine 1951 Convention refugees 
and therefore should be granted regular 1951 Convention refugee 
status. In addition, these 1951 Convention refugees should be given 
the opportunity to remain in the country where they have already 
integrated their lives and established intentional residence. They 
should not be forced to return to their home country or forced to 
resettle in yet another country. 
This Article will attempt to add a new perspective to the overall-
positive idea of temporary protection, an idea aimed toward 
addressing the causes of refugee flight and prompting restoration of 
peace and security in the country of origin, ultimately leading to fast 
 
 10. See, e.g., Bosnian Refugees: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on International 
Operations and Human Rights of the Committee on International Relations, 104th Cong. 
(1995). 
 11. The Dayton Peace Accord, Nov. 21, 1995, Annex Seven, available at 
http://www/usis.usemb.se/bosnia/dayton7.htm (last visited May 1, 2001) [hereinafter Dayton 
Peace Accord].  
 12. See infra  Parts III and IV. 
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and effective repatriation of those forced to flee. Keeping in mind the 
ultimate goal of the entire international peace process in Bosnia -
Herzegovina, the results of this analysis will show that granting 1951 
Convention status to genuine 1951 Convention refugees from Bosnia -
Herzegovina would, in the end, better serve the lasting peace and the 
future prospects of the country. By granting 1951 Convention status 
and later applying the cessation clauses of the 1951 Convention, 
thereby securing the ultimate goals of refugee protection and 
repatriation, the internationa l community would better protect 
refugees from involuntary and premature return and from forced 
application for permanent resettlement in overseas countries. A 
timely and truly voluntary return to Bosnia -Herzegovina, through the 
application of the cessation clauses of the 1951 Convention, would 
better serve the European States’ ultimate goal of temporary 
protection. In addition, voluntary return of Bosnia -Herzegovina 
citizens to their original homes in their home State will incorporate a 
very important human element into the efforts for a lasting peace and 
stable future for Bosnia -Herzegovina. 
Part II of this Article will first analyze the actual causes of 
migration from the Former Yugoslavia in light of the obligation of a 
State not to create refugee outflows. Part II shall then examine 
arguments for the “right not to become a refugee” in the context of 
the war in Bosnia -Herzegovina. Further, Part II will analyze related 
provisions of 1951 Convention, in particular the determination, 
application, and cessation provisions in cases of mass migrations. 
Part III will analyze the normalization process of temporary 
protection in Europe. Here, detailed discussion of the legal 
framework of temporary protection and the actual effects of its 
application to genuine 1951 Convention refugees from Bosnia -
Herzegovina supports the argument for granting regular 1951 
Convention refugee status to the group of genuine 1951 Convention 
refugees under temporary protection. 
Based on the conclusion that both political and legal foundations 
for implementing the concept of temporary protection failed to 
provide adequate protection for genuine 1951 Convention refugees, 
Part IV will address the right of return to the home country–the 
second legal foundation of the European concept of temporary 
protection. Through analysis of the actual process of return to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/4
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Bosnia-Herzegovina, this Part will illustrate that the return process is 
not truly voluntary. Rather, it is a relocation resulting in further 
ethnic division that contradicts the goal the international community 
originally envisioned when it first introduced the concept of 
temporary protection. Part IV will also briefly analyze the legal 
aspects of the possibility that genuine 1951 Convention refugees can 
remain in the host country upon a grant of regular 1951 Convention 
refugee status. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF TEMPORARY 
PROTECTION IN EUROPE AFTER 1990 
A. The Actual Causes of Mass Migrations from the Former 
Yugoslavia  
Beginning in 1991, radical Serbian nationalists in the newly-
independent Republic of Croatia launched a strategic campaign to 
occupy forcefully large portions of territory within the 
internationally-recognized borders of Croatia and to establish a self-
declared “Serbian Republic” within that country. 13 Backed by the 
powerful Federal Yugoslav Army (JNA), Serb nationalists succeeded 
in occupying nearly a third of Croatian territory. 14 In the process, 
thousands of non-Serb civilians were forcibly displaced from their 
homes and subjected to gross human rights violations. The 
international community later determined these acts to be extreme 
violations of the rules of warfare, and thus constituted crimes against 
humanity. 15 The ultimate aim of extreme Serb nationalists in Croatia 
was to acquire, by force and displacement of civilian population, 
territories contiguously linked with Serbia proper, thus creating an 
enlarged Serbian state–a so-called “Greater Serbia.” Within this new 
state, nationalists could take unchallenged political, military, and 
social control.16 A major element of the Greater Serbia campaign 
involved a similar “divide and conquer” strategy for the neighboring 
 
 13. U.S. LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, CRITIQUE (1994) (Croatia Country 
Report), available at http://www.unhcr (last visited Aug. 1, 2001).  
 14. Id. 
 15. HELSINKI WATCH , WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA 20-25 (1992). 
 16. ROY GUTMAN, A W ITNESS TO GENOCIDE vii-viii (1993). 
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state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.17 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most ethnically-mixed of the 
republics within the Former Yugoslavia.18 After independence was 
granted to the Former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia in 
1991, Bosnia-Herzegovina feared domination by the rump-Yugoslav 
states of Serbia and Montenegro. Thus, it sought and was granted 
status as an independent, sovereign state in 1992.19 The first state to 
grant recognition to Bosnia -Herzegovina was the Federal Republic of 
Germany.20 Germany was followed by other countries and, finally, by 
the United Nations (UN).21 Once again, with the logistical and 
strategic support of the Federal Yugoslav Army, radical Serb 
nationalists within Bosnia -Herzegovina launched an aggressive 
military campaign that successfully occupied 70% of the territory of 
the newly formed state of Bosnia -Herzegovina.22 In places where 
military control was not achieved, the nationalists subjected the 
civilian population to large-scale siege warfare. Meanwhile, in areas 
under Serbian control, nationalists conducted a terror campaign that 
included arbitrary arrest, imprisonment in concentration camps, 
murder, rape, torture, forced labor, and other forms of extreme 
harassment and humiliation.23 The result was large-scale 
displacement of the civilian population, a result that forced thousands 
of people to seek refuge in other countries. 
 
 17. S. REP. NO. 102-9892, at 129 (1992). 
 18. See generally  ROY GUTMAN, A WITNESS TO GENOCIDE vii-viii (1993); CRIMES OF 
WAR-WHAT THE PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW? (Roy Gutman & David Reif eds., 1999) [hereinafter 
CRIMES OF WAR]. 
 19. GUTMAN, supra  note 16, at 4-6; see Alexandra McGinley, The Aftermath of the NATO 
Bombing: Approaches for Addressing the Problem of Serbian Conscientious Objectors,  23 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1448, 1473 (2000) (stating that the European Community recognized 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia as independent states in 1992). 
 20. GUTMAN, supra  note 16, at 7-8. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at xxix.  
 23. FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, THE BOSNIAN PEOPLE CHARGE GENOCIDE: P ROCEEDINGS 
AT THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING BOSNIA V.  SERBIA ON THE 
PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE 30-39, 112-44 (1996). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/4
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B. The Obligation of a State not to Create Refugee Outf lows and the 
Emerging Theory of the Right to Remain in the Home Country 
Before addressing the issue of the State obligation not to create 
refugee outflows and the emerging theory of the right to remain in the 
home country in the specific context of Bosnia -Herzegovina, a brief 
overview of the current relationship between refugee law and 
individual state obligations is in order. A number of principles 
characterize and limit the legal significance of refugees in 
international law. On one hand is the principle of state sovereignty, a 
principle related to the ideas of territorial supremacy and self-
preservation. On the other hand are humanitarian principles derived 
from international law and treaties.24 
Nevertheless, refugee law is an incomplete legal system of 
protection aimed at addressing specific situations related to a 
particular refugee crisis. Still, many refugees may be denied even 
temporary protection, and more importantly, the possibility of 
returning safely to their homes.25 International surrogate protection of 
refugees is restricted and exclusively shields only a relative minority 
of those in need.26 It is meant to serve as a temporary measure until a 
refugee is able to return to his home country or to find another 
permanent solution through resettlement. However, the reality of 
today’s needs concerning forced migration is strikingly different from 
the solutions offered by international law. 
The increasing diversity of modern refugee-producing phenomena 
and, in particular, their ability to deprive whole communities of basic 
needs such as food and shelter, as well as the state’s formal 
protection, inevitably led to a reappraisal of the institutional means 
whereby assistance was offered to refugees.27 International refugee 
law was established as the primary form of regulating and controlling 
 
 24. See generally GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL: THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed. 
1996). 
 25. Study on Human Rights and Mass Exoduses, Sarudin Aga Khan, ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.e/1503 (1987). 
 26. PATRICIA TUITT,  FALSE IMAGES—LAW’S CONSTRUCTION OF THE REFUGEE 23 
(1996). 
 27. See McGinley, supra note 19, at 1461.  
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such movements.28 As such, refugee law has both directly and 
indirectly served as a guide in discourse about refugees.29 The 
refugee movement from regions in the developing world to the west 
has been severely constrained by natural and formal barriers.30 Even 
today, viable responses are limited, thus calling into question the 
continued function of the law in this sphere—at least insofar as it 
presently operates to define who is permitted to move between states 
and what qualitative movement should occur.31 
A State does not bear any direct legal responsibility for a refugee 
exodus caused by that state’s breach of its international obligations.32 
However, States are bound by a general principle of international law 
not to create refugee outflows and to cooperate with other states in 
the resolution of such problems as they emerge.33 As a general 
principle, States are obligated to treat their nationals in accordance 
with certain standards of human rights and to re-admit their nationals 
into their territories.34 In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where half 
of its citizens were uprooted by aggression, the responsibility for 
creating the refugee outflows is placed on the side of the aggressor, 
the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia. 
An analysis of the emerging “right to remain in the country of 
origin” theory helps establish a link between the inadequate measures 
taken to preserve and maintain peace in Bosnia -Herzegovina and the 
need to provide 1951 Convention refugee status for those who are 
genuine 1951 Convention refugees. The foundations for introducing 
the concept of temporary protection were: (1) measures to prevent the 
people of Bosnia -Herzegovina from becoming refugees in the first 
place; and (2) guarantees through the peace process to provide for a 
timely return to the home country. The latter was to be accomplished 
through complex measures by the international community aimed at 
 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. TUITT, supra note 26, at 1-3. 
 31. “At the same time as the future of refugee law is being questioned, the morality of its 
past life is under debate, particularly to the extent that it could be said to have helped create 
some of the present anomalies in refugee protection.” TUITT, supra note 26, at 1-2. 
 32. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 140. 
 33. See id. at 149-64.  
 34. VIII ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW 429 (1985). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/4
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effectively restoring a multicultural and democratic society in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.35 In reality, both of these efforts failed. 
In a real and substantial sense, every citizen should have a right to 
remain in their country. After examining the issues of the right to 
remain, in the context of the practical problems and the obvious 
inadequacies of the international preventive peace process in Bosnia -
Herzegovina, clearly those people whose right to remain in their 
home country was not protected should have been given a right to 
remain in the host country through the guarantees of the 1951 
Convention. 
 In a statement to the Commission on Human Rights, Sadako 
Ogata noted the following: 
The right to remain is implicit in the right to leave one’s 
country and to return. In its simplest form it . . . includes the 
right to freedom of movement and residence within one’s own 
country. It is linked also to other fundamental human rights 
because when people are forced to leave . . . a whole range of 
their rights are threatened, including the right not to be 
subjected to torture or degrading treatment and the right to 
privacy and family life.36 
A statement from the Report on Human Rights concerning the 
Former Yugoslavia interestingly notes that: 
A large number of displaced people would not have to seek 
refuge abroad if their security could be guaranteed and if they 
could be provided with both sufficient food supplies and 
adequate medical care. In this context the concept of security 
zones within the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be 
actively pursued . . .. The argument that providing refuge . . . is 
to conform to the policy of ethnic cleansing cannot override 
the imperative of saving their lives . . .. Thus far, European 
countries have agreed to provide refuge to only a small 
percentage of those whose lives are at stake. In order to ensure 
 
 35. See generally Dayton Peace Accord, supra  note 11. 
 36. Sadako Ogata, Statement to the Commission on Human Rights (Mar. 3, 1993) (on file 
with author). 
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that providing refuge will not contribute to ethnic cleansing, it 
is essential to reaffirm and provide lasting protection for the 
right of return.37 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, efforts to prevent a mass exodus of its 
population failed. 38 Either the lack of political power or restrictive 
interpretations of their mandates placed the international community 
and various international agencies in the field in a desperate position. 
They could either monitor the ongoing crime of genocide and the 
process of ethnic cleansing but not take any action, or they could 
assist people in need while simultaneously providing de facto support 
for the process of ethnic cleansing. Attempts to prevent movement of 
the population from Bosnia -Herzegovina, as in the cases of 
Srebrenica and Zepa, resulted in the horrifying crimes of genocide 
against the civilian population whose “right to remain in the home 
country” was supposedly protected by the United Nations Protection 
Forces (UNPROFOR).39 In short, the international community never 
dealt with the causes of the war or effectively identified its 
motivation. Rather, the international community attempted to 
alleviate the resulting human suffering. 
The dilemma is obvious. The right to remain is not a recognized 
human right, and, in some circumstances, enforcing such a right by 
making people risk their lives and stay in their country of origin 
would be contrary to the principles of human rights. As Guy 
Goodwin-Gill concluded, “[t]he ‘prevention of refugee movements,’ 
in particular where the emphasis is on stopping flight rather than 
removing causes, is no solution and, so far as it follows from the 
actions of other States, will often amount to an abuse of rights.”40 In 
the context of Bosnia -Herzegovina, as in many other cases, all efforts 
 
 37. U.N. Division of Int’l Protection, 1st Spec. Sess., at ¶ 25(b)&(2), U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/1992/S-1/10 (1992). 
 38. See CRIMES OF WAR, supra  note 18; PATRICK MCCARTHY ET AL , AFTER THE FALL , 
SREBRENICA SURVIVORS IN ST. LOUIS (2000). 
 39. See generally, T. Modibo Ocran, How Blessed Were the UN Peacekeepers in Former 
Yugoslavia? The Involvement of UNPROFOR and Other UN Bodies in Humanitarian Activities 
and Human Rights Issues in Croatia, 1992-1996, 18 WIS. INT’L L.J. 193 (2000). 
 40. Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The Right to Leave, The Right to Return and the Question of a 
Right to Remain, in THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN THE LIGHT OF CONTEMPORARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES 103 (Vera Gowlland-Debass ed., 1996). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/4
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to remove the causes of flight failed and the right to remain was not 
protected to such an extent as to avoid the need for flight to find 
asylum.  
As Goodwin-Gill notes: 
The right to remain comprises the common or garden sense of 
not having to become a refugee, not having to flee, not being 
displaced by force or want, together with the felt security that 
comes with being protected. It is another way of expressing, in 
concrete terms, the connection between individual, 
community, and territory, but its effective realization depends 
upon human rights and development considerations that are 
staggering in their breadth. Perhaps this is the sort of challenge 
that we need for the next century.41 
C. 1951 Convention Status Determination and its Application in the 
Cases of Mass Migrations 
When thinking of refugees, people most often think of those who 
qualify as refugees under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol. 
The word ‘refugees’ denotes those who are outside of their countries 
of origin, who reasonably believe that they are at-risk for serious 
harm if returned to their countries because of their political or civil 
status, and who can prove that the government of their countries of 
origin cannot or will not provide adequate protection. 42 The adoption 
of the 1967 Protocol extended the 1951 Convention refugee 
definition by eliminating the 1951 Convention’s specified 
geographical and time restrictions.43 Based on different 
circumstances and needs in Africa44 and Latin America,45 the refugee 
 
 41. Id. at 104. 
 42. 1951 Convention, supra  note 3, art. I. 
 43. See supra note 4.  
 44. Organization of African Unity (OAU), Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugee Problems in Africa, June 20, 1974, art. I, pt. 2, U.N.T.S. 14691, available at 
www.unher.eh/refworld/refworld/legal/instrume/asylum/ref_afre.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 
2001).  
. . . [t]he term refugee shall also apply to every person who, owing to external 
aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order 
in either part or the whole of his country of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave 
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definition was extended in order to provide protection for a wider 
group of people forced to migrate from those specific areas. 
However, in the European context, the only valid framework under 
international law for refugee protection are the 1951 Convention and 
its 1967 Protocol. 
For the purposes of this Article, it is important to highlight the 
essential elements a refugee claimant must satisfy in order to be 
recognized as a 1951 Convention refugee: (1) the claimant left his 
country of origin, or a stateless person left his country of habitual 
residence; (2) there exists an actual risk of harm in the country of 
origin; and (3) the claimant must prove a well-founded fear of 
persecution. Other required elements relate to an explicit link 
between the claimant’s fear of persecution and an internationally 
recognized human rights violation, as well as an objective failure of 
the State’s duty to provide protection to its nationals. 
In addition, the risk of persecution must have a direct link to the 
claimant’s race, religion, nationality, membership in particular social 
groups, or political opinions. In other words, the refugee’s claim is 
judged by criteria related to unexpressed political opinions and 
explicit political action. There must also be an established need for 
international protection. Specifically, there must exist no possibility 
of reclaiming protection from the country of origin, no sound 
alternative such as acquisition of other citizenship, and no proof that 
a refugee committed a serious crime against humanity. 
European States insist on a clear-cut distinction between 1951 
Convention refugees and “de facto refugees.”46 De facto refugees are 
those fleeing because of civil wars or generalized violence.47 People 
 
his place of habitual residence in order to seek refuge in another place outside of his 
country of origin or nationality. 
Id. 
 45. Annual Report of Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1984-85, OEA/Ser 
L/II 66. Doc. 10. Rev. 1 at 190-93, available at www.unher.ch/refworld/refworld/legal/ 
instrume/asylum/cnt_eng.htm (last visited Sept. 1, 2001). The Cartagena Declaration states that 
“people who have fled their country because their lives, safety, or freedom have been 
threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflict, massive violations of 
human rights or other circumstances which have seriously dist urbed public order.” 
 46. PIRKKO KOURLA &  MARTINUS NIJHOFF, BROADENING THE EDGES, REFUGEE 
DEFINITION AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION REVISITED 157-58 (1997).  
 47. Id. at 159. 
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fleeing situations of civil wars and generalized violence are excluded 
from 1951 Convention refugee status on three grounds. First, 
governmental actions during civil wars or generalized violence do not 
constitute persecution because such actions are carried out in order to 
uphold law and order and to preserve the integrity of the national 
territory. Hence, governmental actions in civil wars and situations of 
generalized violence are not motivated by the race, religion, ethnic 
origin or political opinion of the victim as is required of 1951 
Convention refugees.48 
Second, people fleeing situations of civil wars and generalized 
violence are not “singled out” for persecution as is required of 1951 
Convention refugees. That is, de facto refugees are not usually 
persecuted individually due to individual characteristics such as race, 
religion, ethnic origin or political opinion. Rather, de facto refugees 
are victims of the general situation in their countries of origin. 49 
Third, some argue that the principle of non-refoulment does not 
cover people fleeing situations of civil war and generalized 
violence.50 This strict interpretation of the 1951 Convention results in 
a detailed, costly, and time consuming individual refugee status 
 
 48. See 1951 Convention, supra note 3, art. I(A)(2). 
 49. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 76. 
Whenever large numbers of people are affected by repressive laws or practices of 
general or widespread application, the question arises whether each member of the 
group can, by reason of such membership alone, be considered to have a well-founded 
fear of persecution; or does persecution necessarily imply a further act of specific 
discrimination, a singling out of the individual? Where large groups are seriously 
affected by a government’s political, economic, and social policies or by the outbreak 
of uncontrolled communal violence, it would appear wrong in principle to limit the 
concept of persecution to measures immediately identifiable as direct and individual. 
Id. 
 50. Non-refoulment is discussed in greater detail in Part III.A.1. See 1951 Convention, 
supra  note 3, art. 33: 
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion. 2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed 
by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the 
security of the country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final 
judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that 
country. 
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determination procedure,51 which is obviously not a practical solution 
when states face the problem of mass migrations of people uprooted 
by civil strife or situations of generalized violence. 
Once a claimant’s status as a 1951 Convention refugee has been 
determined, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) Handbook  implies a certain duration and stability of that 
status. This strict approach towards the determination of refugee 
status eminates from the need to provide refugees with the assurance 
that their status will not be subject to constant review in light of 
temporary changes—not of fundamental character—in the situation 
prevailing in their country of origin. 52 
In many situations of mass migrations, both the UNHCR and the 
national authorities of individual states have applied a “group 
determination” system for refugee status.53 This system assumes that 
the people who have fled certain situations and are seeking refuge are 
prima facie 1951 Convention refugees.54 When utilized, the group 
determination system provides 1951 Convention refugee status to all 
members of the particular group, and thus, access to the full 
protections and rights guaranteed by the 1951 Convention.55 The 
legal consequences of temporary protection in the European context 
are not the same as those of the above-mentioned group 
determination system. Based on the strict distinction between 1951 
Convention refugees and de facto refugees, only the former is entitled 
to full 1951 Convention status; de facto refugees given temporary 
protection are not.56 
At issue are the implications of temporary protection for those 
people who are genuine refugees within the meaning of article 1A of 
the 1951 Convention. From the beginning, UNHCR has been aware 
of the particular problems related to the application of temporary 
protection to genuine 1951 Convention refugees.57 UNHCR has 
questioned whether the 1951 Convention standards for refugee 
 
 51. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6.  
 52. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra  note 6. 
 53. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 78. 
 54. JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 124 (1993).  
 55. GOOWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 149-64. 
 56. WALTER KALIN, TOWARDS A CONCEPT OF TEMPORARY PROTECTION 19 (1996).  
 57. See KOURLA & NIJHOFF, supra note 47, at 110-11. 
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treatment are suitable for situations of mass influx. 58 It is interesting 
to see that the 1951 Convention itself makes distinctions between 
certain levels of applicability.59 
The treatment and adequate protection of the rights of a 1951 
Convention refugee could be improved. The rights guaranteed to 
refugees by the 1951 Convention depend largely on the duration of 
their stay, the refugee’s attitude toward the country of refuge, and the 
refugee’s actual efforts to integrate by forming intentional residence 
in the country of refuge.60 Based on these factors, temporarily 
protected people who are genuine 1951 Convention refugees, legally 
residing in the host country for a long period of time, might improve 
their situation in the host country by invoking 1951 Convention 
guidelines. 
In sum, the status rights guaranteed under the 1951 Convention 
vary depending on the character of the refugee’s stay in the host 
country. Certain rights are available to all refugees regardless of 
whether their presence in the country of refuge is considered lawful 
or not.61 However, all of the 1951 Convention provisions should 
apply to temporarily protected people who are in fact 1951 
Convention refugees. In addition, the right to self-employment and 
freedom of movement should also be available to the group of 
genuine 1951 Convention refugees granted temporary protection.62 
Interestingly, most status rights are granted to refugees who are 
“lawfully staying” or “residing” in the country of refuge.63 Although 
“lawfully staying” does not require permanent settlement, a refugee 
must show intent to stay and a certain duration of residence.64 After 
five years in host countries, many people’s temporary shelters have 
become their homes.65 Therefore, all of the guarantees available to 
 
 58. UNHCR Divisio n of Int’l Protection, ¶ 28.29, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/830 (1994). 
 59. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 307. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See supra note 6. 
 62. See supra note 6. 
 63. See supra note 6.  
 64. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 309. 
 65. People from the Former Yugoslavia have various social, cultural and geographical ties 
to Germany. For example, the two countries shared in common migrant workers and had many 
immediate family links. As a result, the majority of people who fled Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Croatia sought refuge in Germany where their family, relatives or friends already lived. Thus, 
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1951 Convention refugees should be available to genuine 1951 
Convention refugees who are under temporary protection. 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, both the needs of genuine 1951 
Convention refugees and the ultimate goal of the temporary 
protection concept would be better served if genuine 1951 
Convention refugees under temporary protection were granted 
regular 1951 Convention status. The most favorable outcome of 
refugee protection in general, and temporary protection in particular, 
is return to the home country.66 An analysis of the cessation clauses 
provides a useful foundation for the proposition that peace and future 
stability in Bosnia-Herzegovina will be better achieved through 
granting regular 1951 Convention refugee status and timely 
application of the 1951 cessation clauses.  
Article 1C(1) of the 1951 Convention sets the conditions under 
which a 1951 Convention refugee’s status ceases. These conditions 
are based on the consideration that international protection should not 
be granted where it is neither necessary nor justified.67 The first four 
conditions are based on the willful act of the individual who decides 
either to reestablish himself in his country of origin or to avail 
himself of the protection of his country.68 The last two cessation 
clauses are based on the consideration that international protection is 
neither needed nor justified due to changes in the country where 
persecution was feared, making the reasons a person became a 
refugee nonexistent.69 The most important issue regarding these last 
two cessation clauses is the restriction in application provided in 
UNHCR’s Handbook : “Provided that this paragraph shall not apply 
to a refugee falling under section A1 of this Article who is able to 
invoke compelling reasons arising out of previous persecution for 
refusing to avail himself of the protection of the country of his 
nationality.”70 
In additional, the UNHCR’s Handbook specifies that the cessation 
clauses are “negative in character and are exhaustively enumerated. 
 
Germany sheltered the majority of refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovian and Croatia. 
 66. See KALIN, supra note 56; KOURLA & NIJHOFF, supra note 46, at 120. 
 67. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra  note 6.  
 68. See id. 
 69. See id. 
 70. See id. 
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Therefore they should be interpreted restrictively, and no other 
reasons may be adduced by way of analogy to justify the withdrawal 
of refugee status.”71 The last two cessation clauses provide an ideal 
foundation for the timely and safe return of genuine 1951 Convention 
refugees under temporary protection in Europe. Further, the 
restrictions on their application provide safety for those among this 
group whose past persecution enables them to invoke compelling 
reasons not to return to their home countries. However, the provisions 
of the 1951 Convention protect only those who have been able to 
establish that they are 1951 Convention refugees at the outset.72 
These provisions are of no use to genuine 1951 Convention refugees 
under temporary protection. 
III. THE FORMALIZATION OF TEMPORARY PROTECTION 
In 1992, European governments were confronted with the fact that 
1951 Convention refugee status was not practical in times of mass 
migration, as existed during the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia.73 
Thus, the UNHCR introduced the concept of temporary protection as 
an element of the Comprehensive Response to the Humanitarian 
Crisis in Former Yugoslavia in order to cope with the problems 
caused by the flight of hundreds of thousands from armed conflict, 
genocide, “‘ethnic cleansing’ and other forms of systematic and 
serious human rights violations.”74 In 1993, the Council of Europe 
Report recommended to the European States that they should “clarify 
the legal status of temporary refugees.”75 
 
 71. UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status Under 
the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1988 
HCR/IP/4/ENG. REV. 1, 111-39 [hereinafter UNHCR Handbook]. 
 72. 1951 Convention, supra note 3, art. I. 
 73. See McGinley, supra note 19, at 1463-64. 
 74. Note on International Protection , UNHCR Division of Int’l Protection 22-24, U.N. 
Doc. A/AC.96/830 (1994). 
 75. EUR. P ARL. DOC. (Com. 6740) ¶ 5 (1993). In Recommendation 1205 on the situation 
of refugees and displaced people in several countries of the former Yugoslavia, adopted by the 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on February 3, 1993, the Assembly 
recommended that the Committee of Ministers “instruct the competent committee to speed up 
the work to clarify and harmonize at regional level the legal status of people fleeing situations 
of war or generalized violence who are in need of temporary protection.” See also 
Recommendation 1236 (1994) on the Right of Territorial Asylum, adopted on April 12, 1994, 
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According to UNHCR, temporary protection: 
[h]as served as a means, in situations of mass outflow, for 
providing refuge to groups or categories of people recognized 
to be in need of international protection, without recourse, at 
least initially, to individual refugee status determination. It 
includes respect for basic human rights but, since it is 
conceived as an emergency protection measure of hopefully 
short duration, a more limited range of rights and benefits are 
offered in the initial stage than would customarily be accorded 
to refugees granted asylum under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol. In many respects it is a variation of the 
admission and temporary refuge based on prima facie or group 
determinations of the need for international protection that 
have been used frequently to deal with mass flows of refugees 
in other parts of the world.76 
In the context of the Former Yugoslavia, the following basic 
elements of temporary protection were defined by UNHCR: 
Admission to safety in the country of refuge; 
respect for basic human rights, with treatment in accordance 
with internationally recognized humanitarian standards such as 
freedom of movement in the country of refugee with 
restrictions limited to those which are necessary in the interest 
of public health and public order; necessary assistance 
covering the food, shelter and basic sanitary and health 
facilities; non-discrimination; free access to courts and other 
competent administrative authorities; respect for family unity; 
protection against refoulment; repatriation when conditions in 
the country of origin allow.77 
In summary, “[t]he idea was to provide protection against refoulment 
 
where the Assembly recommends that the Committee of Ministers, “considering the 
developments in the former Yugoslavia, urge member states to extend protection to displaced 
people through applying accordingly the number of minimum standards as formulated in 1981 
in Conclusion No. 22 (XXXII) on the protection of asylum-seekers in situations of large-scale 
influx of the Executive Committee of the UNHCR.” Id. ¶ 8ii. 
 76. See Note on International Protection, supra  note 74, ¶ 46. 
 77. See id. ¶ 48.  
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and respect for fundamental human rights while waiting return in 
safety and with dignity following a political solution of the conflict in 
former Yugoslavia. The other intention was to avoid overwhelming 
the national refugee status procedures already considered as 
overburdened.”78 
Several European states responded positively to UNHCR’s 
invitation to implement the concept of temporary protection. In most 
cases without formal refugee status,79 approximately 700,000 people 
from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia found shelter in Western 
Europe.80 
Thus, some states implemented the new concept on an ad hoc 
basis using the existing legislation. 81 Later, some states developed 
specific legislation for temporary protection based on the need for 
sheltering people from the Former Yugoslavia and concerns over the 
concept’s applicability to possible future situations of mass 
migration. 82 Plans for the adoption or abandonment of temporary 
protection reflect the various approaches by individual states.83 
Acceptable treatment of temporarily protected people varies 
amongst the states.84 The number of people from the Former 
Yugoslavia granted temporary protection status in different states 
ranges from less than 2,000 in Finland and Spain to 350,000 in 
Germany.85 Apart from obvious differences, all European states 
agreed on return as the only outcome of the temporary protection 
 
 78. See Luca Donatella, Questioning Temporary Protection, 6 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 535, 
535 (1994).  
 79. See, e.g., UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6. 
 80. Report of the Sub-Committee of the Whole on International Protection ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. 
A/AC.96/858 (1996).  
 81. See McGinley, supra note 19, at 1466-69 (discussing the temporary protected status of 
refugees). 
 82. See id. 
 83. See Kalin, supra note 56. 
 84. There are huge differences with respect to the fundamental rights that are guaranteed. 
For example, access to education is granted in all countries with regard to primary and 
secondary education, while only some countries extend access to higher education. The right to 
work is given in most countries, although not immediately or unconditionally. Housing 
assistance is provided in all states, most often in reception centers. However, the family 
reunification process for nuclear family members differs significantly from State to State. 
 85. Humanitarian Issues Working Group of the International Conference on the Former 
Yugoslavia, Survey on the Implementation of Temporary Protection  31, 71 (1995), available at 
http://www.unhcr.ch/legaldocuments/8.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2001). 
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system and further agreed on a limited duration of protection after 
which all people should be returned to their countries of origin as 
soon as possible.86 
Upon UNHCR’s efforts to promote and implement temporary 
protection, European states moved towards a unified approach on the 
temporary protection of people fleeing conflict in the Former 
Yugoslavia.87 In 1992, the beginning of the war in Former 
Yugoslavia, a meeting of the Immigration Ministers convened in 
London.88 The Immigration Ministers adopted the Conclusion on 
People Displaced by the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia , 
concluding that states were ready to provide shelter for people from 
the Former Yugoslavia that were coming directly from areas of 
military activity and, thus, were unable to return to their homes.89 It 
further found it important to provide protection to people returning 
from bordering states to dangerous areas.90 It also stated that admitted 
individuals should be given opportunities in terms of local integration 
and social and educational benefits, all aimed at providing better 
conditions for their prospective returns.91 
Interestingly, UNHCR stated during that same meeting that its 
views on temporary protection for people fleeing the conflict in the 
Former Yugoslavia were that “[s]tates do not necessarily need to 
provide simultaneous access to individualized asylum procedures.”92 
Obviously, UNHCR found it more important to secure shelter for 
the large number of people fleeing the war than to protect the rights 
of those genuine 1951 Convention refugees among them. Further, in 
1993, UNHCR adopted the resolution setting forth common 
guidelines for the admission of particularly vulnerable people from 
 
 86. KALIN, supra  note 56. 
 87. See McGinley, supra  note 19, at 1466-67 (discussing the codification of temporary 
protected status in Western European law). 
 88. See KALIN , supra note 56. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See Nadia Yakoob, Report on the Workshop on Temporary Protection: Comparative 
Policies and Practices, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. (1999).  
 91. Conclusion on People Displaced by the Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia  ¶ 4 (1992) 
(meeting of Ministers Responsible for Immigration, London, Dec. 1992), available at 
http://www.unhcr.ch/legal/bibliolgraphic/papers.4htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2001).  
 92. Id. ¶ 6. 
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the Former Yugoslavia.93 This resolution extended temporary 
protection to specific categories of people, such as: (1) those who 
were detained in a prisoner-of-war or internment camp whose lives 
are presently threatened; (2) those who are injured or seriously ill; (3) 
those who could not obtain adequate medical treatment locally; (4) 
those who are under direct threat to life or limb and who could not be 
protected otherwise; and (5) those who were subjected to sexual 
assault, if there are no means to help them locally. 94 
The resolution created neither obligations for the member states to 
accept fleeing people nor individual rights for those granted 
temporary protection. Its greatest accomplishment was the creation of 
a framework for a unified policy regarding the grant of temporary 
protection by individual states.95 Finally, in 1995, the Resolution of 
the Council of the European Union on Burden-Sharing With Regard 
to the Admission and Residence of Displaced People on a Temporary 
Basis was adopted.96 The goal of the resolution was to use earlier 
decisions related to the Former Yugoslavia to develop a concept 
generally applicable for situations of mass influx.97 However, 
members of the European Union (EU) are not obligated to grant 
temporary protection as individual rights. Rather, this resolution 
provided a concept for possible mass influx situations where 
protection was unavailable in a region close to the region of origin or 
where the EU is close to the region of “refugee source.”98 
Significantly, the resolution presents the principle of “burden-
sharing,”99 but does not address the unique standard of treatment for 
people under temporary protection. Due to the need to assist large 
 
 93. ELSPETH GUILD, THE DEVELOPING IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICIES OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: ADOPTED CONVENTIONS, RESOLUTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, DECISIONS 
AND CONCLUSIONS 293-309 (1996). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 299. 
 96. Resolution of the Council of the European Union on Burden-Sharing With Regard to 
the Admission and Residence of Displaced People on a Temporary Basis, September 25, 
1995, at 1, available at http://www.eurdpa.en.int/eur -lex/en/resolution_95/pdf (last visited Sept. 
1, 2001). 
 97. Id. ¶ 8 (Preamble). 
 98. Id. ¶ 2. 
 99. Id. ¶ 4. “[T]he burden in connection with the admission and residence of displaced 
people on a temporary basis in a crisis could be shared on a balanced basis in a spirit of 
solidarity.” Id. 
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numbers of people fleeing war, civil war, or any situation of 
generalized violence, apart from protection of 1951 Convention 
refugees, different parts of the world adopted different approaches. 
African states adopted a regional convention applicable in all 
situations of flight.100 The Cartagena Declaration of 1984 extended 
the 1951 Convention refugee definition, providing protection for 
various causes of flight.101 Unlike other global regions, European 
states have maintained a strict distinction between 1951 Convention 
refugees and other de facto refugees that were forced to migrate but 
did not fall within the strict framework of the 1951 Convention.102 
Additionally, the European states emphasized return as the only 
solution for temporarily protected people.103 In contrast, the African 
or Southeast Asian approach uses temporary protection as a 
predecessor to permanent admission or to resettlement in neutral 
countries.104 In conclusion, European states were not willing to 
broaden the coverage of the 1951 Convention. For the European 
states, the concept of temporary protection provided an ideal means 
of protecting those fleeing civil wars and other situations of 
generalized violence. Meanwhile, the European states have kept the 
traditionally narrow 1951 Convention definition for 1951 Convention 
refugees. 
A. The Legal Framework of Temporary Protection  
Temporary protection is not an established part of public 
international law. Rather, it is a political instrument designed to cope 
with specific situations, such as the mass migration of people caused 
by the war in the Former Yugoslavia.105 
In accordance with the general principle of international law, 
individual states have absolute power of discretion in admission of 
 
 100. 1969 OAU Convention, supra note 44. 
 101. Cartegena Declaration, supra  note 45. 
 102. See KOURLA & NIJHOFF, supra note 46, at 157-58. 
 103. See generally, Yakoob, supra note 90, at 236 (contending that refugees admitted t o a 
country under temporary protection often never leave). 
 104. African states look at return as the optimal result but stress it should be truly voluntary 
in nature. In South-East Asia, resettlement to a third country was the most common option for 
temporary protected people. 
 105. KALIN, supra  note 56. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol6/iss1/4










2001]  Temporary Protection in Europe After 1990 133 
 
 
aliens to their respective territories. While there is a right to apply for 
asylum, no state is required to grant it.106 Article 31 of the 1951 
Convention provides for the protection of refugees who are legally in 
the host country, but the second paragraph clearly says that states are 
free to send refugees to another country and to deny them admission 
even on a temporary basis.107 However, there are a few elements from 
sources such as treaties and customary laws that limit State power 
with respect to the treatment of aliens or refugees.108 
First, Article 33, paragraph 1 of the 1951 Convention prohibits 
sending refugees back to the country of persecution; the country 
where their lives or freedom would be threatened because of their 
“race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or 
political opinion.” 
Second, according to the 1951 Convention, states are obligated to 
provide all refugees in their territory certain status rights such as the 
freedom of movement within the country of refuge; assistance with 
food, shelter, basic sanitary and health facilities; freedom from 
discrimination; access to courts; and respect for family unity. 
Third, human rights conventions explicitly prohibit the return of 
individuals to situations of imminent torture or serious human rights 
violations and also provide for other basic human rights applicable to 
the treatment of people under temporary protection status.109 
1. The Principle of “Non-Refoulment” 
Given the reality of States’ lack of obligation to grant asylum 
under international law, the principle of “non-refoulment” is 
fundamental to refugee protection under the 1951 Convention. 110 The 
 
 106. G.A. Res. 2312, U.N. GAOR, 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1968). 
 107. 1951 Convention, supra  note 3, art. 31:  
The Contracting States shall not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or 
presence, on refugees who, coming directly from a territory where their life of freedom 
was threatened in the sense of the Article 1, enter or are present in their territory 
without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the 
authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence. 
Id. 
 108. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 14-16. 
 109. Id. at 109. 
 110. 1951 Convention, supra  note 3, art. 33:  
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principle of non-refoulment provides for protection from return to 
situations of persecution even if the asylum application is denied or 
rejected by the host country.111 Apart from the 1951 Convention, the 
principle of non-refoulment has become a norm of customary 
international law.112 It prohibits forcible return to the country of 
persecution as well as rejection at the state border of the host 
country.113 UNHCR’s position on non-refoulment is illustrative: 
Every refugee is, initially, also an asylum seeker; therefore, to 
protect refugees, asylum seekers must be treated on the 
assumption that they may be refugees until their status has 
been determined. Otherwise, the principle of non-refoulment 
would not provide effective protection for refugees, because 
applicants might be rejected at borders or otherwise returned to 
persecution on the grounds that their claim has not been 
established. 114 
The principle of non-refoulment protects people granted 
temporary protection who were excluded from individual refugee 
status determination procedures as well as people for whom such 
procedures are postponed under the presumption that they may be 
1951 Convention refugees.115 However, those who are genuine 1951 
Convention refugees lose legitimate rights with the passage of time 
by the granting of temporary protected status.116 First, if the 
individual is denied access to a status determination, temporary 
protection provides the same benefits and lasts an equal amount of 
time for both genuine 1951 Convention refugees and those who do 
 
No Contracting State shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life of freedom would be threatened on account of his 
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee 
whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the 
country in which he is, or who, having been convicted by a final judgment of a 
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country. 
Id. 
 111. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 118-19. 
 112. Id. at 167. 
 113. Id. at 123. 
 114. Note on International Protection , supra note 74, ¶ 11. 
 115. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 118-19.  
 116. Id. 
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not fit the criteria definitions. Second, if the individual status 
determination is postponed until the end of the temporary protected 
status, those who had a valid refugee claim may not be able invoke it 
due to the period of time spent under temporary protection.117 A 
strong refugee claim may weaken with time, especially because the 
authorities deciding to lift temporary protection status will neither be 
patient nor have the resources to fulfill their obligation of conducting 
individual status determination interviews properly. In practice, a 
1951 Convention refugee claim basically consists of two elements; 
one subjective and the other objective.118 A “well-founded fear of 
persecution” is established by balancing subjective fear with 
objective evidence that lends credence to the authenticity of the 
established subjective fear.119 With the passage of time, the situation 
in the home country might significantly change enough to provoke a 
decision to end temporary protection. This may also diminish the 
objective elements of the individual’s claim to 1951 Convention 
refugee status.120 
Nevertheless, the principle of non-refoulment secures admittance 
to the host country and provides safety until the reasons for flight 
from the home country no longer exist.121 Also, the principle of non-
refoulment is invoked if the solution of resettlement to a third country 
 
 117. A “well-founded fear of persecution” is always future oriented, i.e., towards the 
prospect of possible return. Thus, actual past persecution may play a significant role in 
preventing the return of the recognized 1951 Convention refugee, but does not significantly 
advance the assertions of those genuine refugees who spent a significant period of time under 
temporary protection. 
 118. See UNHCR Handbook, supra note 71, at 11. 
 119. See id. 
 120. For a better illustration: A person detained in the prison camp for a significant period 
of time, subjected to various sorts of torture based on his ethnicity, religion, or political opinion 
will not be “offered” to return to his habitual residence, neither by the authorities of the host 
country nor by the country of origin, as it is absolutely impossible in most of the cases. After 
the end of temporary protect ion, instead of remaining in the host country, such individual will 
be offered return to his home country, but to an area designated by the government. However, 
the past persecution in the context of temporary protection may not be a sufficient ground for 
establishing the needed “well-founded fear.” This is due to the safety guarantees offered by his 
home country of returning him to some other area where his ethnicity constitutes majority 
population. The only option apart from return would be resettlement to a third country. In the 
case of refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina, only the United States, Canada, and Australia 
offer this possibility. 
 121. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 124. 
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is not possible. Most important, the non-refoulment principle sets the 
criteria for the termination of temporary protection, ensuring that 
repatriation can take place only when the danger of persecution in the 
country of origin no longer exists.122 
Some states have argued that the principle of non-refoulment does 
not apply in cases of mass influx because, under the 1951 
Convention, non-refoulment protects only 1951 Convention 
refugees;123 most people fleeing war, civil war, and situations of 
generalized violence are not 1951 Convention refugees.124 Some 
states deny asylum to these types of refuge seekers arguing that such 
people are not 1951 Convention refugees because they were not 
“singled out” for persecution. 125 These states claimed that 
government actions in such cases did not constitute persecution and 
were not based on the race, religion, ethnic origin or political opinion 
of the refugee.126 This interpretation results from a narrow reading of 
the 1951 Convention. 127  
The position of the UNHCR is significantly different. It asserts 
that many states do in fact recognize the need to provide protection to 
people fleeing civil wars, as they might have well-founded fears of 
persecution based on their race, religion, ethnic origin or political 
opinion. 128 Additionally, the agents of persecution might be de facto 
authorities or other unofficial groups and thus it is not only the 
national government that is, in such situations, either unable or 
unwilling to provide adequate protection for its nationals.129 
 
 122. Id. 
 123. 1951 Convention, supra  note 3, art. 1A(2):  
As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion is outside of the country of his nationality 
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his 
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable, or, owing to such fear, 
is unwilling to return to it. 
Id. 
 124. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 137 n.93. 
 125. Id. at 12. 
 126. HATHAWAY, supra note 54, at 45. 
 127. 1951 Convention, supra  note 3, art. 1A(2). 
 128.  See GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 7-18.  
 129. Note on International Protection , supra note 74, ¶ 22. 
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Although civilians exposed to war activities between the front 
lines were not “singled out for persecution” in the Former 
Yugoslavia, they were usually targeted either because of their ethnic 
or religious backgrounds or as victims of “ethnic cleansing.”130 
Persecution of civilians based on political, racial and religious 
grounds are recognized as constituting crimes against humanity.131 
Thus, proof of a “well-founded fear of persecution”132 is not 
precluded by the fact that a person fled from civil war. However, in 
reality, many people fleeing situations of generalized violence or civil 
wars will not meet the 1951 Convention refugee criteria.133 In a 
situation when temporary protection is granted, the host country will 
usually accept both genuine 1951 Convention refugees and other 
people who fall within a wider category of the refugee definition. 
General principles of international law obligate states to assist in 
humanitarian efforts and to cooperate in finding a solution to the 
problems of mass migrations, regardless of the legal classifications of 
people arriving at host countries on a large-scale basis.134 In other 
words, there is a general obligation to assist both those who would 
meet the stringent criteria of a 1951 Convention refugee and those 
who would not. In addition, states are bound to cooperate and find 
solutions in such cases by the mandate given to UNHCR.135 States 
agreed on the UNHCR mandate, but then were trying to avoid 
individual responsibility in situations of mass migrations, justifying 
their non-participation with the fact that the people in question were 
not genuine 1951 Convention refugees.136 However, involuntary 
mass-migrations became an increasingly serious problem, and 
eventually the previously reluctant states started to officially invite 
UNHCR to assist in these situations.137 Thus, in 1957 UNHCR was 
 
 130. See MCCARTHY ET AL ., supra note 38, at 45. 
 131. Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of People Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia 
Since 1991, reprinted in  32 I.L.M. 1195, art. 5(h) (1993), available at http://www. 
icty.com/general.statute.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2001).  
 132. HATHAWAY, supra  note 54, at 72. 
 133. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 18-29. 
 134. Id. at 25-28. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 29-31. 
 137. Id. at 9-10. 
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asked for the first time to assist in a situation of mass flight involving 
Chinese refugees fleeing to Hong Kong. 138 In 1973, the General 
Assembly called upon UNHCR to “continue assistance and 
protection activities in favor of refugees with its mandate as well as 
for those to whom UNHCR extends its ‘good offices’ or is called 
upon to assist in accordance with relevant resolutions of the General 
Assembly.”139 
In the 1994 Note on International Protection, the General 
Assembly stated: 
In accordance with these resolutions, and with the strong 
support of the Executive Committee and of the international 
community as a whole, it has been the regular and consistent 
policy and practice of UNHCR to provide international 
protection, mobilize humanitarian assistance and seek 
solutions for refugees from armed conflicts as well as those 
fleeing persecution. 140 
The central dilemma is: The difference between UNHCR’s 
extended mandate and States’ obligations to provide protection for all 
people falling within the extended definition of a refugee.141 
However, “good faith” is a general principle of international law. 
Once a state becomes a member of the United Nations, with all 
attendant rights including a voice in the General Assembly, good 
faith behooves the state to abide by General Assembly decisions.142 
In addition, states that are parties to the 1951 Convention “undertake 
to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees . . . in the exercise of its functions, and 
shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of 
the provisions of the Convention.”143 
It is more or less obvious that states cannot ignore their duty to 
contribute to adequate solutions in situations of mass influx of both 
 
 138. In situations of mass flight, not all people are genuine 1951 Convention refugees 
within the strict definition of the article 1 (A). 1951 Convention, supra  note 3, art. 1(A). 
 139. G.A. Res. 3143, U.N. GAOR, No. 27, U.N Doc. 3143 (1984). 
 140. Note on International Protection , supra note 74, at 31. 
 141. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 214. 
 142. U.N. CHARTER art. 2. 
 143. 1951 Convention, supra  note 3, art. 35(1). 
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refugees who fall within the strict interpretation of the 1951 
Convention and those who do not. At the same time, European States 
are not legally obligated to accept the extended refugee definition and 
all of its resulting legal implications. 
2. Human Rights Instruments’ Support for the Temporary 
Protection System 
Although the documents creating the EU do not refer to the 1951 
Convention, both the 1966 United Nations Covenant and the 
European Human Rights Convention—the system of temporary 
protection developed in response to the Former Yugoslavia’s 
breakdown–are well-grounded in human rights law.144 Human rights 
law prohibits forcible return to situations of danger, as specified in 
Article 3(1) of the 1984 Convention Against Torture, which reads: 
No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to 
another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture. 
Similarly, the United Nations Human Rights Committee, on the 
basis of Article 7 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,145 stated that State Parties must not expose individuals to the 
danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment upon return to another country by way of their 
extradition, expulsion or refoulment. Even the European Human 
Rights Commission, in a case involving a Somalian refugee in 
Austria, confirmed that Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights prohibits the return of a person who fears serious 
human rights violations in his home country, apart from the situation 
of an ongoing civil war where persecutors may have been non-
governmental actors.146 
Human rights law provides protection against forcible return to 
the country of origin where a person would be exposed to inhumane 
 
 144. KALIN, supra  note 56, at 21. 
 145. The Covenant also states that no one shall be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, that no one shall be subjected without his free 
consent to medical or scientific experimentation. 
 146. Sharif Hussein Ahmed v. Austria, App. No. 25964/94, 6 Eur. H.R. Rep. 254 (1995) 
(Commission Report).  
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or degrading treatment.147 On the other hand, human rights law sets 
out basic principles regarding return to the home country when 
reasons for flight no longer exist.148 Similar to an individual’s 
freedom to leave and seek refuge in other countries, a person’s right 
of return, to choose his residence, and to move freely within his 
country of nationality are also protected by human rights law. This 
provides security to individuals forced to leave their countries by 
allowing them to utilize their citizenship rights once the reasons for 
fleeing no longer exist. The right of return to one’s country is a part 
of the provision of “freedom of residence and movement” provided 
for in Article 13(1) of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.149 This same right also is provided by Article 12, paragraph 4 
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which states that “no 
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own 
country.”150 Apart from the principle of non-refoulment, the right of 
return is the key concept envisaged by the temporary protection 
system.151 
B. The Effect of Applying Temporary Protection to Genuine 1951 
Convention Refugees 
A large number of people fleeing from the Former Yugoslavia in 
Europe were, in fact, genuine 1951 Convention refugees.152 These 
people faced the danger that temporary protection could merely 
become a more expedient substitute for 1951 Convention refugee 
status. The first categories of people for whom the EU provided 
temporary protection were “people who have been held in a prisoner-
of-war or internment camp and who cannot otherwise be saved from 
a threat to life or limb.”153 A majority of the detainees in this group 
fulfilled all the requirements to attain 1951 Convention refugee 
 
 147. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 125. 
 148. Id. at 124. 
 149. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
Supp. No. 3, at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948), available at www.un.org/overview/rights.html 
(last visited Sept. 1, 2001). 
 150. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1966). 
 151. McGinley, supra note 19, at 1466-68. 
 152. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 19-20. 
 153. See, e.g., GUTMAN, supra  note 16. 
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status.154 The people in this group were “singled out” for persecution, 
frequently tortured, and both physically and sexually assaulted.155 
Such persecution was based on the detainees’ religious or ethnic 
backgrounds.156 
A similar situation existed for those in the third category on the 
EU’s list: “people who are or have been subjected to sexual assaults 
provided that there is no suitable means for assisting them in safe 
areas situated as close as possible to their homes.”157 During the war 
in Bosnia-Herezogivna, rape was used as an instrument of warfare. 
Victims were of the same religious and ethnic background, and their 
persecution claims satisfied the high status standards under Article 
1(a) of the 1951 Convention. 158 The need for protection in such cases 
had its roots not only in the need for assistance, but also in the well-
founded fear of persecution.159 
In conclusion, beneficiaries of temporary protection consist 
largely of people who fulfilled the criteria for 1951 Convention 
refugee status under Article 1(a) of the 1951 Convention, but who 
were denied official 1951 Convention status. Thus, the question of 
access to individual status determination procedures in the cases of 
mass influx is of some importance. Again, UNHCR’s position 
interestingly states that “while people receiving temporary protection 
should not be precluded from applying for refugee status, the 
consideration of such claims could be suspended while they enjoyed 
temporary protection.”160 
With respect to genuine 1951 Convention refugees, among the 
group of those temporarily protected, exclusion from the status 
determination procedure is incompatible with the obligations of 
States party to the 1951 Convention if a State either denies 
convention rights guaranteed to refugees lawfully in the country or 
forcibly returns such people without examining their refugee 
 
 154. See, e.g., id. 
 155. See, e.g., id. 
 156. See, e.g., id. 
 157. GUTMAN, supra note 16, at 187. 
 158. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 19-20. 
 159. KALIN, supra  note 56, at 31. 
 160. Note on International Protection , supra note 74, ¶ 3. 
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As the 1951 Convention does not provide for national status 
determination procedures, the principle of good faith in fulfilling 
treaty obligations requires States party to the 1951 Convention to act 
accordingly. 162 At least five different models of dealing with these 
problems exist.163 The first model integrates temporary protection 
into the asylum procedure.164 Temporary protection can be granted 
only after rejection of an asylum request. Both Sweden and 
Switzerland adopted this model of temporary protection. 165 In 
contrast, under a second model, temporary protection in the United 
Kingdom is lifted if a person applies for asylum, but temporary 
protection is reinstated if the asylum application is rejected.166 In 
Spain, temporarily protected people can apply for asylum and keep 
their temporary status if their asylum applications are denied.167 A 
third model is applied in Denmark, Norway and France. In these 
countries, temporary protection status is limited in duration to two or 
three years, and authorities automatically start the asylum procedures 
for temporarily protected people if return is not possible within that 
period of time.168 A fourth model, proposed in Switzerland, would be 
to grant asylum at the end of temporary protection status.169 The most 
problematic approaches are the last models in which temporarily 
protected people are excluded from the asylum application procedure, 
such as in Germany and Finland.170 Finish authorities were quick to 
abandon the temporary protection concept.171 In Germany, 
temporarily protected people had an opportunity to apply for 
 
 161. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 124. 
 162. KALIN, supra  note 56, at 32. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6, at 191, 202. See 
also KALIN , supra note 56, at 42. 
 166. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6, at 46. 
 167. Id. at 177. 
 168. Id. at 79, 160. 
 169. See KALIN, supra note 56, at 33 (“Here, the asylum procedure serves to determine 
who still have valid reasons to invoke protection under the 1951 Convention when temporary 
protection is lifted”). 
 170. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6, at 116, 118. 
 171. Id. at 94. 
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In short, procedural and administrative efficiency provide States 
with incentives to accept the concept of temporary protection. 
Additionally, temporary protection provides several political and 
economic advantages for individual States that permanent asylum 
does not.173 First, administrative and economic resources are saved 
through the absence of a full asylum procedure assessing individual 
claims and applying a prima facie group determination. 
Second, it becomes easier politically to return the refugee if the 
situation in the country of origin changes, for then it is not a question 
of withdrawing a residence permit but, rather, of not renewing it. In 
this way, a signal is sent to the refugee that his stay in the specific 
country is only temporary. Finally, a signal is sent to the public at 
large that this refugee situation is purely a matter of protection with 
no elements of voluntary migration. 174 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT OF RETURN TO THE HOME COUNTRY 
This analysis of the right of return to the home country will serve 
as a foundation for further discussion of the actual repatriation 
process in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addit ion, it will assist in 
understanding the emerging argument that those refugees whose right 
to remain was not protected, and those refugees whose voluntary 
right of return, in dignity and safety, was not guaranteed should be 
granted 1951 Convention status because application of the temporary 
protection concept surfaced crucial flaws. 
People of all ethnicities from the Former Yugoslavia may have 
had a right to remain at home; however, the fact is that over 700,000 
sought and received temporary protection from ethnic and political 
violence that existed in their home countries. Within the context of 
the protection of citizens, the State’s right to protect its citizens 
 
 172. For Bosnian refugees under temporary protected status in Germany, a Resettlement 
opportunity to the United States was offered as the only solution for those unwilling or unable 
to return “voluntarily” to Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 173. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6, at 25. 
 174. Morten Kjaerum, Temporary Protection in Europe in the 1990s, 6 INT’L J. REFUGEE 
L. 444, 449-50 (1994). 
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abroad175 corresponds to its obligation to accept its citizens who are 
not allowed to stay in other States.176 Hence, citizens have a right of 
return to their country of citizenship. The background of the right of 
return lies between the lack of a general duty for states to accept and 
accommodate foreigners, and the right of an individual to enter his 
country on the basis of nationality. Article 9 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights implies a right of return to one’s own 
country, and such right is expressly recognized in Article 13(2) of the 
same document.177 The key word, and the only restriction placed on 
the right of return, is that of “citizenship.” The European Convention 
provides that citizens shall not be deprived of the right to enter their 
own country. The issue of actual return and right of return is subject 
to the relations between the state of origin, the state of refuge, and the 
international community. As Goodwin-Gill states: 
The relevance and importance of the human rights dimension 
for refugees is obvious, for the primary solution of voluntary 
repatriation is premised upon their basic human right of return 
to their own country in conditions of security. The State of 
origin may seek to “write off” those who have fled, and to 
ignore the link of nationality, but this potentially involves a 
breach of the obligation to the State of refuge, even though in 
the prevailing the actual return of refugees may be prohibited 
by the principle of non-refoulment.178 
With respect to nationality as the basis for the right of return, 
some clarification is needed. If a person’s nationality is not clear, or 
if the state wishes to deter the return of those who previously fled by 
depriving them of their nationality, such actions would be directly 
contradictory to the principles of international law.179 Further, 
problems arise with in the case of the imposition of administrative 
 
 175. DANIEL TURACK, THE PASSPORT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 133 (1972). 
 176. GUY GOODWIN-GILL, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE 
BETWEEN THE STATES 45 (1978). 
 177. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 149, at 71. Article 13(2) reads as 
follows: “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.” Id. 
 178. GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 101. 
 179. Kay Hailbronner, Comments on: The Right to Leave, the Right to Return and Remain; 
the Question of a Right to Remain, in THE PROBLEM OF REFUGEES IN THE LIGHT OF 
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES 109, 116 (Vera Gowland-Debbas ed., 1996). 
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and procedural obstacles to prevent the return of nationals. “The 
practical operation of return agreements has frequently been impeded 
by bureaucratic obstacles and excessive requests concerning proof of 
nationality.”180 Apart from the issue of citizenship, an important one 
in the context of Bosnia and Herzegovina,181 the key issue is whether 
we can consider “the right of return to one’s home country” fully 
exercised in the context of the return process to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina if the country of origin cannot guarantee safety, but 
rather offers the option of relocation to the areas of “ethnic majority,” 
designated by the government. Actual cooperation between the State 
of refuge and the State of origin is an undeveloped area of 
international law, and most states already insisted on prescribing the 
rights based on which the actual return will take place.182 
The Dayton Peace Agreement’s Annex Seven sets the basic 
principles and conditions by which the repatriation to Bosnia -
Herzegovina should be implemented.183 The reality of the ongoing 
return process, however, indicates that there are deviations from 
Annex Seven which contradict the most important principles of 
voluntariness and return to the State of origin. 
A. Basic Principles of Voluntary Repatriation 
An analysis of the basic principles of repatriation and comparison 
with the principles of return upon termination of temporary 
protection status should provide an additional argument for approval 
of regular 1951 Convention status. A discussion of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement’s Annex Seven will provide a better picture of the “truly 
voluntary” aspect of the return to Bosnia and Herzegovina–the major 
repatriation operation after the end of temporary protection in other 
European countries.  
 
 180. Id. 
 181. The phenomenon of “dual citizenship” legislation largely complicates the issue of 
return to the places of original residence for the entire group of refugees who do not belong to 
the “ethnic majority group” in their hometowns.  
 182. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the states of refuge dictated the return based 
on the “carrot and stick” method, while the country of origin agreed to implement legal and 
effective safety measures to ensure the return of “nationals,” under criteria of “ethnicity,” often 
through return projects lacking basic provisions with respect to dignity and voluntariness. 
 183. See Dayton Peace Accord, supra  note 11.  
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Temporary protection can be terminated as soon as a safe and 
dignified return to the state of origin is possible. Annex Seven of the 
Dayton Peace Agreement on Refugees and Displaced People184 
incorporates this principle, representing the framework for 
repatriation to Bosnia -Herzegovina. The basic principles of 
repatriation are safety, dignity, and voluntariness.185 
The notions of safety and dignity are not clear, and at least three 
different definitions exist, all related to repatriation to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Safety is defined as return “without harassment, 
arbitrary detention or physical threats during or after return;”186 
“return without risk of harassment, intimidation, persecution, or 
discrimination, particularly on account of ethnic origin, religious 
belief, or political opinion;” 187 and “return which takes place under 
conditions of legal safety (such as amnesties or public assurances of 
personal safety, integrity, non-discrimination and freedom from fear 
of persecution or punishment upon return), physical security 
(including protection from armed attacks, and mine-free routes . . .), 
and material security (access to land or means of livelihood).”188 
According to UNHCR in the context of repatriation to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, safety consists of the implementation of military 
measures safeguarding the peace and the proclamation of amnesty for 
crimes, other than serious violations of international humanitarian 
law.189 It is interesting to note that the existence of such an 
International Peace program is one of the conditions of application 
for temporary protection. It will also be interesting to see the 
relationship between the “voluntariness” element of repatriation, and 
the actual effects of the military measures. 
While the principle of “dignity” is even more difficult to define, it 
is “serious, composed, worthy of [honor] and respect.”190 In practice, 
dignity must include a provision that: 
 
 184. See id. 
 185. See infra note 190. 
 186. Executive Committee Conclusions No. 65 (XLII), para. 3 (1991), available at 
http://www.unhcr.ch/legal.bibliographic/conc.12htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2001). 
 187. See Dayton Peace Accord, supra  note 11, art. 1, ¶ 2. 
 188. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6. 
 189. KALIN, supra note 56, at 44. 
 190. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra  note 6. 
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Refugees must not be manhandled; that they can return 
unconditionally and that if they are returning spontaneously 
they can do so at their own pace; that they are not arbitrarily 
separated from family members, and that they are treated with 
respect and full acceptance by their national authorities, 
including the full restoration of their rights.191 
Definitions of those two elements are important indicators of the 
conditions necessary for termination of temporary protection. 
UNHCR identified the elements of the return with “safety and 
dignity”: (1) refugee’s physical safety at all stages during and after 
their return including en route, at reception points, and at the 
destination; (2) the need for family unity; (3) attention to the needs of 
vulnerable groups; (4) the waiver, or, if not possible, reduction to a 
minimum of border crossing formalities; (5) permission for refugees 
to bring their moveable possessions when returning; (6) respect for 
school and planting seasons in the timing of such movements; and (7) 
freedom of movement.192 
The first elements of a return with both safety and dignity are the 
right of return to one’s country, a recognized human right,193 together 
with the corresponding duty of the country of origin to permit the 
return of its citizens. According to Annex Seven of the Dayton Peace 
Agreement, refugees and displaced people “have a right to freely 
return to their homes of origin,” and states have a duty to “accept the 
return of such people who have left their territory, including those 
who have been accorded temporary protection by third countries.”194 
With respect to these first elements, legal safety requires positive 
legislation and actual implementation–meaning a functional and 
operative administrative and judicial system in the country of origin. 
Material assistance and availability of reconstruction and 
development programs are additional elements. In the case of Bosnia -
Herzegovina, refugees and displaced people were granted “the right 
to have restored to them property of which they were deprived in the 
course of hostilities . . . and to be compensated for any property that 
 
 191. See id. 
 192. See id. 
 193. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 150, art. 12(4). 
 194. See 1951 Convention, supra note 3, Annex 7, art. 1(1). 
Washington University Open Scholarship










148 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 6:109 
 
 
cannot be restored to them.”195 The Commission for Displaced People 
and Refugees, formed in Sarajevo, is in charge of receiving and 
deciding claims for property in Bosnia -Herzegovina.196 Although its 
decisions are final and “recognized as lawful throughout Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,” the Commission lacks enforcement power and thus 
has no recourse against noncompliance.197 
By monitoring the repatriation process through domestic 
mechanisms, UNHCR and other international organizations remain 
important elements in the return process.198 The High Commissioner 
should be recognized as having a legitimate concern for the 
consequences of return, particularly where such return has been 
brought about by amnesty or other form of guarantee. Within the 
framework of close consultations with the state concerned, the High 
Commissioner should be given direct and unimpaired access to 
returnees, thereby placing him in a position to monitor fulfillment of 
amnesties, guarantees, or assurances on the basis of which the 
refugees have returned. Such access should be inherent in the High 
Commissioner’s mandate.199 
The element of voluntariness is the most difficult to define. 
However, when the criteria for safety and dignity are met, a question 
arises whether people under temporary protected status can be 
repatriated only on a voluntary basis or whether forced return is 
permissible. People whose refugee claims were not asserted should 
be allowed to invoke protection from forcible return under the 1951 
Convention. 200 
Before analyzing the issues of refugee status determination 
procedures in five-year-long temporary protection cases, and the 
likelihood that a genuine 1951 Convention refugee might invoke all 
rights prescribed by the 1951 Convention, we will examine the 
change in efforts of the host countries and UNHCR regarding the 
return to Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
 
 195. See id. 
 196. See id. art. 11. 
 197. Davor Sopf, Repatriation, in BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA: PERSPECTIVES 59, 357 (Dr. 
Wilfried Heller & Dr. Hansjorg Brey eds., 1997). 
 198. Id.  
 199. Executive Committee Conclusions, supra note 186. 
 200. 1951 Convention, supra  note 3, art. 33. 
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Promotion of voluntary repatriation is a regular activity among 
States, but the problem remains that some states actively enforce 
repatriation of people regarded as no longer in need of international 
protection. 201 The High Commissioner stated: 
[W]e can no longer passively wait for conditions to change so 
that refugees can volunteer to return. Instead, we must work 
actively to create the conditions conducive to their safe return. 
It is important therefore that the protection debate moves on 
from interpreting voluntary repatriation solely in terms of the 
expression of individual will to the creation of conditions of 
safety—in the refugee camps, in the reception centers and in 
the home areas.202 
With respect to genuine 1951 Convention refugees under 
temporary protection status, the conditions of Article 1C(5) of the 
1951 Convention203 should be met if a person had no access to 
individual status determination procedures before making any 
decision to repatriate. States which excluded temporarily protected 
people from the indiv idual refugee status determination procedure 
should provide a regular and fair opportunity for individuals to claim 
their well-founded fears of persecution and, thus, be protected by the 
principle of non-refoulment. 
Upon previously concluding that those people who, at the time of 
the lifting of temporary protection, still have valid reasons to invoke 
protection under the 1951 Convention should not be forcibly 
returned, the realistic constraints on the exercise of this obligation by 
the host states deserves some attention. The 1951 Convention does 
not address the issue of refugee status determination procedures. This 
 
 201. KALIN, supra  note 56, at 49. 
 202. See Opening Statement by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees at the 
Forty-Sixth Session of the Executive Committee of the United Nations High Commissioner’s 
Programme, UN Doc. A/AC. 96/860, reprinted in  4 REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 6 (1995). 
 203. See 1951 Convention, supra note 3, art. 1C(5): 
This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A 
if: . . . 5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in [connection] with which he 
has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail 
himself of the protection of the country of his nationality . . ..  
Id. 
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very important and practical area is left entirely to the individual 
decisions of States.204 Furthermore, the assessment of claims for 
refugee status complies with the analysis of subjective and objective 
elements205 while the interpretation of the 1951 Convention 
regulations is largely based on generally accepted rules.206 With 
respect to the States domination procedure, the burden of establishing 
a case is on the refugee claimant. However, certain personal 
considerations relating to the traumatic experiences of flight are 
important to the means and methods used to evaluate the facts and 
credibility of refugee claims.207 The most important element is the 
establishment of the “well-founded fear of persecution.” A well-
founded fear requires that the applicant’s fear have its basis in 
external or objective facts showing a realistic likelihood that the 
applicant will be persecuted upon his return to the home country.208 
In practical terms it means that “the applicant’s fear should be 
considered well-founded if he can establish to a reasonable degree, 
that his continued stay in his country of origin has become intolerable 
to him for the reasons stated in the defin ition, or would for the same 
reasons be intolerable if he returned there.”209 
The crucial element of refugee status determination procedures for 
genuine 1951 Convention refugees under temporary protection is 
different from persecution experienced or reasonably feared.210 The 
element of “well-founded fear” is always future oriented, meaning 
that many temporarily protected people who had clear elements of 
well-founded fears of persecution in the period of their flights may 
have no guarantees that, after more than five years, they could 
successfully invoke the same rights that should have initially been 
available to them.211 Even when the situation in their home countries 
 
 204. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 34. 
 205. HATHAWAY, supra  note 54, at 82. 
 206. See GOODWIN-GILL, supra note 24, at 34 (the “UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status was prepared at the request of states members of the 
Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Program, for the guidance of governments”).  
 207. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra  note 6, at 195-205. 
 208. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 37. 
 209. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra  note 6. 
 210. HATHAWAY, supra  note 54, at 88. 
 211. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6 (noting a 
“change of circumstances in the country of origin”). 
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has changed so drastically that safety and dignity becomes possible, 
genuine 1951 Convention refugees under temporary protection 
should have a right to reject return to “some other, safe area of their 
home countries.”212 The international community “reasonably 
expects” the same from them. However, cessation clauses213 were 
rarely or almost never used for 1951 Convention refugees granted 
proper status in most of the European countries.214 Thus, the element 
of “voluntariness” has no significance in the ongoing repatriation 
process of Bosnia -Herzegovina, because temporary protected status 
was granted to the refugees. 
Moreover, relying on the reasons why most of the European 
countries accepted the concept of temporary protection and the 
absence of the 1951 Convention regulation dealing with the refugee 
status determination procedures, individual States will most likely try 
to avoid their duties or implement them in a way that is less effective 
for refugee claimants. Apart from the enormous efforts by UNHCR 
to secure fair and suitable treatment for potential 1951 Convention 
refugees upon the end of their temporary protection status,215 
involuntary repatriation, with all its negative impacts on Bosnia -
Herzegovina’s future, or resettlement to third countries are the only 
feasible solutions.216 
At this stage of transfer from temporary protection to durable 
solution, an important issue regarding the length of temporary 
protection has arisen.217 The entire temporary protection concept 
concerns the return of beneficiaries as soon as the situations in the 
countries of origin change and reasons for temporary protection cease 
to exist. People who have been granted temporary refuge cannot be 
left forever in a status of uncertainty. A right to remain after a certain 
period of time must exist, after taking into account all relevant 
factors, including the duration of stay, connections with the receiving 
 
 212. See id. 
 213. See id. 
 214. The majority of the people granted refugee status in Europe were “political refugees” 
coming from the East and Central European countries.  
 215. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra note 6 
(questioning: “How long temporary should be?”). 
 216. Sopf, supra note 197, at 309. 
 217. KALIN, supra  note 56, at 51. 
Washington University Open Scholarship










152 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 6:109 
 
 
country, and assimilation to its living conditions. The circumstances 
under which a right of temporary residency develops into a right of 
permanent residency are still a domestic matter. However, there may 
be limits on domestic discretion, based on humanitarian 
considerations, similar to those developed under the European 
Convention of Human Rights with respect to the protection of family 
and marriage.218 State practice is largely diverse. In some cases there 
is no defined limit on temporary protection status. In other States, the 
period lasts from three to five years.219 State practice and other 
indicators220 support a reasonable limitation of five years on 
temporary protected status. 
In conclusion, “the right to remain in the host countries” for 
temporarily protected, genuine refugees from Bosnia -Herzegovina, 
through the granting of 1951 Convention refugee status, should be a 
logical and fair solution at the end of the refugees’ temporary 
protection status. The duration of stay, family links, as well as 
geographical and cultural links are additional arguments for granting 
regular 1951 Convention status. The only class of residents with an 
absolute right to live in a country are that country’s own citizens. 
Clearly, refugees cannot claim a right to remain on that ground. 
Rather, their position should be assimilated into that of the 1951 
Convention refugees. In particular, these refugees should be protected 
by the principles of non-refoulment and voluntariness of return. 
B. Return Process to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Temporary 
Protection: Relocation or Repatriation? 
The main issue concerning the return of temporarily protected 
people from Bosnia -Herzegovina was whether return to other parts of 
the country was permissible, or whether return should have taken 
place at the original and habitual residences of the returnees. The 
Dayton Peace Agreement recognized return to the place of former 
 
 218. Hailbronner, supra  note 179, at 117. 
 219. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, supra  note 6, at 45. In the 
Netherlands the limit is three years; in Norway four years; in Switzerland four years; in 
Denmark two years; in Sweden one year; and in the United Kingdom seven years. 
 220. See KALIN, supra  note 56, at 51 (“107 out of 184 armed conflicts between 1945 and 
1994 lasted less than five years”). 
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habitual residence.221 In reality, however, the majority of people who 
returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina were able only to go to the places 
designated by the Bosnian Government, based on the “ethnic 
majority principle.”222 Although a return to the place of former 
habitual residence should be the guiding principle when temporary 
protection is lifted,223 international refugee law does not prohibit an 
“internal settlement alternative” if safety in a certain area of the State 
of origin is at an acceptable level and people concerned “could be 
reasonably expected to go there.”224 With respect to temporary 
protection, an individual can reasonably be expected to return to a 
safe part of his home country that is not his habitual residence if the 
requirements of safety and dignity are fulfilled. 225 Such “reasonable 
expectations” should not be applicable to the process of return to 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, as such a provision is contrary to the principle 
set forth by Article 1, paragraph four of Annex Seven.226 
The reality of the process of return to Bosnia -Herzegovina clearly 
showed that the determination of the host countries to terminate 
temporary protection and to send people to the country of origin was 
stronger than arguments based on the principle of truly voluntary 
repatriation, and consequently UNHCR’s efforts.227 Thus, embodied 
in the concept of temporary protection, the right of return to one’s 
country, if exercised prematurely, may become a double -edge sword. 
A peace process should not be seen simply as a mechanism 
enabling society to end hostilities and return to “normal.” Rather, the 
very nature of the process may transform an economy and society in 
unexpected ways and engender new forms of economic, social and 
 
 221. See Dayton Peace Accord, supra  note 11. 
 222. See, e.g ., Sopf, supra note 197. 
 223. KALIN, supra  note 56, at 48. 
 224. GOODWIN-GILL, supra  note 24, at 252. 
 225. McGinley, supra note 19, at 1466-68. 
 226. See 1951 Convention, supra note 3, Annex 7, ¶ 4.  
Choice of destination shall be up to the individual or family, and the principle of the 
unity of the family shall be preserved. The Parties shall not interfere with the 
returnees’ choice of destination, nor shall they compel them to remain in or move to 
situations of serious danger or insecurity, or to areas lacking basic infrastructure 
necessary to resume a normal life. 
Id. 
 227. Sopf, supra note 197, at 310. 
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physical insecurity. It is essential that policy makers concerned with 
issues of peace and rehabilitation recognize and anticipate this 
possibility. 228 
In the context of return to Bosnia -Herzegovina, UNHCR’s 
position clearly stated: “these early returns will only consolidate 
ethnic division and will virtually eliminate the voluntary nature of the 
returns guaranteed in Annex [Seven]. Furthermore, forced returns are 
a direct assault on the UNHCR’s authority to organize and implement 
an orderly and phased repatriation according to the Operational 
Plan.”229 
Summarily, under the principles of “non-refoulment,” of the 
“right of return” incorporated into the concept of temporary 
protection, UNHCR’s Operational Plan, and Annex Seven of the 
Dayton Peace Accords the planned return of the genuine 1951 
Convention refugees will further the “ethnic division” of the Bosnian 
society. It will also truly override the principle of non-refoulment that 
should be applied, especially to protect this category of people 
granted temporary protection. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Temporary protection, as used in Europe in the context of mass 
migrations from the Former Yugoslavia, is a part of the broader 
spectrum of activities the international community used to address 
the problem of that conflict. This concept was meant to bridge two 
gaps: between the binding principle of non-refoulment and the 
discretionary character of asylum; as well as between the strict 
European approach granting protection to 1951 Convention refugees 
and the need for protection to the larger group of people not fulfilling 
the requirements of the 1951 Convention, but who nonetheless are 
forced to flee their countries due to the dangers of armed conflict or 
human rights violations.  
Temporary protection is appropriate in situations involving mass 
 
 228. Peter Utting, Linking Peace and Rehabilitation in Cambodia , in BETWEEN HOPE AND 
INSECURITY —THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CAMBODIAN PEACE PROCESS (Peter Utting 
ed., 1994). 
 229. Statement by Soren Jesen-Petersen, UNCHR Special Envoy for Former Yugoslavia 
(Sept., 1994) (on file with author).  
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influxes of people seeking refuge abroad, where most of these people 
are not 1951 Convention refugees and where the international process 
is aimed at the reestablishment of the conditions allowing for a safe 
and dignified return.230 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, particularly, 
temporary protection was merely a part of the International Peace 
Process aimed at preventing mass exoduses of civilian populations, at 
securing basic political and military conditions for the restoration of 
the democratic and multi-ethnic society, and at leading to the return 
of those people who fled the country and found shelter in European 
countries.231 
In reality, however, the efforts to provide security and to ma intain 
peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina failed, thereby resulting in a large 
number of civilians seeking refuge abroad. The first founding 
element of temporary protection proved unworkable, and the “right 
not to become a refugee” was not protected for a large number of 
citizens of Bosnia -Herzegovina.232 Furthermore, based on different 
interpretations of the war in Bosnia -Herzegovina, those forced to flee 
were characterized as defacto refugees and automatically excluded 
from the protection available under the 1951 Convention. Sadly, the 
majority of these people were indeed genuine 1951 Convention 
refugees but were only given temporary protection status.233 
At the end of temporary protection, these genuine 1951 
Convention refugees from Bosnia -Herzegovina were either forced to 
return to their home country or to apply for permanent resettlement in 
overseas countries.234 However, neither premature and involuntary 
return to the home country nor permanent resettlement in overseas 
countries produces the future stability and peace needed in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. These were the international community’s original 
goals at the beginning of the war, developed upon application of the 
concept of temporary protection. The actual possibility of return to 
the home country is based on the principle of return to the “majority 
areas,” in which people do not return to their original homes but to 
 
 230. McGinley, supra note 19, at 1466-67. 
 231. Id. at 1466-69. 
 232. See Gutman, supra note 16, at 20-23. 
 233. See McGinley, supra note 19, at 1466-69. 
 234. See id. 
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the areas of their ethnic majority as designated by government. This 
principle serves the final ethnic division of the country but is contrary 
to the basic principles of the Dayton Peace Accords and UNHCR’s 
repatriation plan.235 
Most genuine 1951 Convention refugees from Bosnia -
Herzegovina spent over five years under temporary protection in 
various European states. As a result, they should be granted regula r 
1951 Convention refugee status and, thus, given the opportunity to 
remain in the countries where they have already integrated their lives 
and established intentional residences. They should not be forced to 
return to their home country or to resettle in some other country. Both 
the goal of temporary protection and the ideal end of 1951 
Convention refugee status is voluntary repatriation to the home 
country. This category of people should be given the opportunity to 
exercise their right of return to their homes in a dignified way that 
would protect their individual rights and bring more stability to the 
future of Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Finally, granting 1951 Convention refugee status and timely 
application of the 1951 Convention’s cessation clauses will better 
protect the rights of individuals and serve the goals of both the 
international community and the Republic of Bosnia -Herzegovina. 
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